The Foundations Read online

  Yulian Vladimirovich Bromley’s Theory of the Ethnos

  Another direction in Russian Ethnosociology is connected with the works of the academic Yulian Vladimirovich Bromley (1921–1990), who studied the problems of the ethnos in the context of official Soviet science, based on the dogma of the class-based and economic nature of societies (including archaic ones).10 In order to stay within the bounds of the acceptable, he had to adjust his studies of ethnic phenomena to the tune of Soviet Marxism, the specifics of the political moment, internationalist rhetoric, and the idea of progress, from which it followed that a phenomenon like the “ethnos” did not exist in the USSR at all, and perhaps, does not in principle exist at the contemporary stage of development of social relations in capitalistic — and even more so in socialistic — countries. Bromley’s works are practically impossible to read nowadays, since it is unbelievably difficult to break through the very complicated references to Marxist dogma (the meaning of which is almost lost) to reach what he himself wanted to say. Regrettably, this “inarticulateness” is inherent also to the following generation of “ethnologists” in Bromley’s school, who are distinguished by a complicated and baseless scholastic terminology and an increased dependence on the political state of affairs (since the ethnic problem is a fairly painful topic for the leadership and society also of contemporary Russia as well), which greatly detracts from the scientific content of their work.

  We will look more closely at the Russian sources of ethnosociological sciences and their structure in a separate chapter.11

  Foreign Ethnosociology

  Foreign sociology goes back to one of the early founders of the field, the German sociologist, Max Weber, who introduced the concept of “ethnicity” (Ethnizität) into scientific circles.

  The first properly ethnosociological school, which also arose in Germany, started to use the term “Ethnosociology.” Its founders were Richard Thurnwald (1869–1954) and Wilhelm Mühlmann (1904–1988), who laid down the conceptual basis of this discipline.

  A direct analogue to the German school was the American school of Cultural Anthropology, founded in the USA by German emigrant Franz Boas (1858–1942). The American school produced a whole constellation of first-rate ethnologists, sociologists, and anthropologists with names recognized world-wide.

  In England, Ethnology and Sociology were also inseparably intertwined with the sociological approach. This tradition is connected with Bronisław Malinowski (1884–1942) and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955).

  In France, closest of all to Ethnosociology stands the ethnologist and philosopher, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), the founder of “Structural Anthropology.”

  A more detailed analysis of their ideas will be carried out in a separate chapter.12

  Ethnos and Race

  In some languages ethnos is thought of as a synonym of “race,” and ethnic belonging as a synonym of racial belonging. For instance, in German the word “race” (Rasse) and “ethnos” (Ethnos) have approximately the same meaning. But in a strict sense and in commonly accepted scientific use “race” necessarily indicates biological cohesion, the certified fact of belonging to a progenitor. For that reason, a strict definition of “race” does not refer to “belief in a common origin.”

  For instance, if we are talking about members of a “yellow race,” then the persons studied should have a yellow-colored skin, narrow eyes, broad cheekbones, a round face, a specific mark on the sacral bone, noticeable right after the birth of a child (the so-called “Mongolian spot”), firm black hair, and so on. But whether the studied individual considers himself a member of the “yellow race” or not means nothing. In the concept of “race,” emphasis is placed on the aggregate of physiological, phenotypic and genetic characteristics. Belonging to a race implies the physiological identification of a bodily organism, proven by some scientific means.

  There exist many different methods for determining racial belonging. In the 19th century, theories were based on visual observation (skin color, height, proportions of the limbs of the body, characteristic hair growth and their structure) and measurements of bodily proportions.13 Within the framework of such an approach, called “Anthropometry,” the skull is measured, and the structures of the ears, muscles, and the face are described. Anthropometry includes in itself Cephalometry (measurement of the skull), Osteoscopy (the study of the length and breadth of bones) and so on. In the 20th century serologic means started to be employed, based on the study of the structure of blood serum.14

  More broadly spread at the present time is genetic theory, which traces the racial origins of various people to a common ancestor (the Human Genome Project).15

  But, however we might relate to these methods from a scientific point of view (and many scientists contest their reliability), they have absolutely nothing to do with the way the ethnos is understood in Ethnology, Ethnography, and Ethnosociology. The ethnos of ethnosociology has no relation to the scientifically (with the help of whatever methods) verified biological and physiological qualities of a person. In a scientific context, the term “ethnos” is used without reference to race. It is not accidental that for both Shirokogoroff and Weber the issue is precisely about “acknowledgement” [TN: avowal] by a human collective of a common origin.

  For example, a person considers himself Russian. It is entirely possible that, from a racial point of view, he may belong to an anthropological type altogether uncharacteristic for the main population of Eastern Slavic-Great Russians. But from an ethnic point of view, there can be no doubt that he will be Russian if he considers himself Russian, speaks Russian, thinks in Russian, and is a co-participant in Russian culture. His biological or racial belonging may be extremely vague. But from the point of view of Ethnosociology we are undoubtedly dealing with a member of the Russian ethnos.

  Let us now put the question differently: does the ethnos exclude biological cohesion? Of course not. Moreover, when people live near one another, speak the same language, relate to one another closely and often over the course of many generations, start families, and produce children, obvious similarities appear in their features. In ethnic societies, where ethnicity (in the sociological sense, as a unity of language, belief in a common origin, common traditions and a shared way of life) is strong, those entering into this ethnos as a rule reproduce others who look like them. But Ethnosociology does not ascribe any substantial or semantic indication to physical resemblance. It studies the structure of society and only society. And the society it studies is an ethnic society, a specific kind of society as ethnos. Moreover, the physiological, biological, zoological and anthropometric components of this society are not only not the cornerstone; they are not studied at all, since there are no reliable studies (besides racist nonsense) about their credible connection with social peculiarities.

  Ethnos and Nation

  Not being a racial category, the ethnos is also neither a political nor a legal category. It is no less important to distinguish the ethnos from the nation than to distinguish it from race.

  In Shirokogoroff and Weber’s definitions of the ethnos, there is no indication of its political belonging or of its relation to one or another state or any other kind of administrative unit. In the classical understanding of the term, “nation” signifies citizens, united politically into a unified state. For this reason, in French there is an established political term État-Nation, “nation-state,” which shows that the nation is inseparably connected with the political system of the state, and unites in a specific formation [TN: образование, which can also mean “education” and “constitution”] the citizens of that state.

  Not every kind of state is a “nation-state.” Nation-states (or national states) are contemporary states of the European type, most often secular and based on the political dominance of the bourgeoisie. Only with respect to the citizens of such a contemporary, secular (non-religious) bourgeois state can we employ the designation “nation” with complete justification. In o
ther situations, this will be an unauthorized transference of one semantic complex onto an entirely different one.

  We see the signs of the ethnos in all societies, archaic and contemporary, Western and Eastern, those organized politically and those living communally. But the signs of the nation are found only in contemporary, Western (in their organization), and politicized societies.

  We will speak in more detail about the phenomenon of the nation and its relation to the ethnos in a separate chapter.16

  Ethnos and Society

  Now we will look at the relationship between the ethnos and society, which will bring us directly to that fundamental reality studied by Ethnosociology.

  Shirokogoroff calls the ethnos “a group of people,” and a group of people is a form of organization of society. Thus, we can consider the ethnos a specific form of society. But it is worth paying attention to the following circumstance. Max Weber, who introduced the concept of “ethnicity” into sociological circles, did not give it a special significance and even stated that the category of “ethnos” is in some respects unnecessary, inasmuch as it adds nothing to the classical methods of Sociology. Sociology studies any societies whatsoever, including ethnic ones, with the help of identical scientific instruments, and for that reason the ethnos, as also any other form of society, is considered by it on a universal basis.

  Moreover, if we apply to the ethnos the system of coordinates of classical Sociology (see Figure 1), we notice a very interesting regularity. Ethnic society, taken in its pure guise, possesses, as a rule, minimal differentiation (degree of difference) along both axes (X and Y). This means that in the ethnic community both hierarchical stratification (i.e. differentiation according to strata/classes) and differentiation according to groups are minimal. The ethnic group equalizes and unites all its members into something whole, single and indivisible. In such a group both differences and hierarchies are brought down to a minimum, and even if they are present, they do not determine ethnicity and its structure, but that which unites the members into a single and indivisible whole does; hence, the equality and unity of all with all in the structure of the ethnos.

  The ethnos is a society in which collective identity is maximal, total, and all-embracing. This collective identity completely subordinates to itself all other forms of differentiation.

  Weber did not give great significance to “ethnicity” for precisely this reason. His Sociology (“understanding Sociology”), based on the study of individual behavior in the main, is focused on highly differentiated types of society (ancient and contemporary). The ethnos, however, is neither individual nor differentiated. If we place the ethnos on the sociological system of coordinates (see Figure 1) then we get an interesting picture: along both axis y and axis x all values will tend toward zero — in the ethnos, stratification and division into groups is minimal.

  From this we can draw two conclusions.

  The first conclusion (in the spirit of Weberian or Marxist Sociology, focusing its main attention on class-based and economic differentiation) is this: the ethnos does not merit the special interest of the sociologist since the basic characteristics of society as such are minimal and tend toward zero in it.

  The second conclusion, on the other hand, proceeding from the ethnos as the principal matrix on which is built (and from which arises) all of the more complex and differentiated types of society, affirms the ethnic society as basic and fundamental, deserving, for this reason precisely, privileged study. Ethnosociology and Cultural Anthropology hold this position. This very position forms the basis of the discipline of Ethnosociology, which, being conceived of in this way, becomes not an incidental and instrumental branch of general Sociology, but rather opens up as the most important and principal part of sociological knowledge.

  The ethnos is the primordial society, which lies at the basis of all societies. In order to underscore the character of the ethnos, fundamental for humanity, the founder of Ethnosociology Richard Thurnwald called his main scientific work Human Society in its Ethnosociological Foundations.17

  Ethnos as Koinon

  We can liken the ethnos as the basic form of society to a geometrical point, which, on one hand, gives rise to a plane (space consists of an infinite number of points), and on the other hand does not itself have an area (hence its definition as not having an area). The function of a geometrical point in the formation of space is paradoxical: it gives rise to space, but it is not itself space, since it has no area (or extent).

  The relationship of the ethnos to society on the whole is approximately similar. The ethnos gives rise to society and its structures (based on vertical and horizontal differentiation), which possess, correspondingly, non-zero indicators; it lies at the foundation of society and its structures. But the ethnos itself does not have habitual social structures, i.e.; it is society with null-differentiation, similar to a mathematical point with a null-area.

  Of course, any physical point that is depicted or taken as a model will have both an area and an extent. But they will be so small that they can be neglected during measurement. It is exactly the same in the case of the ethnos. Any concrete ethnos will have a minimal amount of stratification and division into social groups, but in comparison with other types of society it is possible to disregard them and, theoretically, to think of them as absent. The purport of society is to emphasize and assert collective identity not only as a goal, a project, or a cohesion of separate parts, but as a given, organic fact and the sole possible form of self-identification. Another definition follows from this:

  The ethnos is society, the differentiation of which is minimal and tends toward zero or (theoretically) is altogether absent.

  In different disciplines, there are special terms that describe the main elements, not resolvable into parts, from which more complex structures are produced. In Physics, they are called “atoms” (literally, “indivisibles”); in linguistics, “semes” (from the same Greek root from which is formed the word “semantics,” “the science of meanings”). In phonetics, the “phoneme” is the smallest atom of the acoustic expression of speech. Lévi-Strauss, who studied the structure of myths, proposed the similar term “mytheme,” i.e. the minimal and indivisible core of mythological storytelling. A myth is composed of a combination of mythemes. Continuing this line, we can introduce a neologism: “koineme.” It is formed from the Greek word κοινόν (koinón), which signifies “common,” “universal,” and also κοινωνία (koinounía) — “society,” “community.” Koineme in this case will mean that indivisible origin that lies at the basis of society, just as a mytheme does at the basis of myth and a seme at the basis of semantics.

  In this conception, the ethnos is a koineme. Society in the broad sense is formed on an ethnic basis and grows from an ethnic core (most often from several cores) as from a seed.

  Holomorphism of the Ethnos

  All societies are arranged according to the principle of functionality, also called “holomorphism” (from the Greek root ὅλος (hólos), “whole,” and μορφή (morphé), “form”). This means that society contains in itself the paradigm of its own structure in its integral aspect, and if some part is removed from society (one of its members), after some time it will re-establish the missing elements, as a lizard re-establishes its tail. As opposed to mechanisms, holomorphism is inherent to organisms, which are composed of a totality of functions and not details; the shortage of a concrete element is replaced due to the fact that its functional significance is preserved. Society is capable of itself re-establishing its own integrity with reliance on itself and on the basis of its inner resources. That is how the lizard’s tail, the newt’s leg, and a person’s hair or nail grows.

  Holomorphism is present in different types of societies to different degrees. But in some societies the processes of the functional replacement of elements occurs quickly and easily, while in others it happens slowly and problematically. The more complex the structure of a society — the higher the le
vel of differentiation of strata and groups — the more complex the question of functional replacement becomes and the more mechanical its procedure. Simple societies re-establish holomorphism automatically. In complex societies, a managing apparatus is required for this.

  The ethnos is a type of society in which holomorphism is total and absolute. The ethnos is so trans-individual that it can fail altogether to take note of the loss of an individual or group of individuals, and also not distinguish one individual from another. The being of the ethnos is purely functional; any sign, subject-matter, phenomenon or event is integrated into a general holomorphic structure, in which the whole predominates. Europeans were struck by this characteristic of archaic tribes, capable of trading away their riches for bric-a-brac, or fertile land for cheap ornaments. “Bric-a-brac” and “ornaments” were interpreted in the holomorphic structure of the former’s society as something important, whose functional significance could be enormous — something the Europeans missed, having approached the question from their more differentiated and mechanical point of view.

  This functionalism of archaic societies was studied in detail by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. Essentially, their reconstructions describe the extreme forms of holomorphism.

  Functionality and holomorphism in their extreme expression are the key distinguishing features of ethnic societies. In them the whole (hólos) prevails absolutely over the parts, and the particular exists only as a function of the whole; outside the whole, the particular has no meaning, and hence also no being.

  III. Ethnos as Concept and Ethnos as Phenomenon

  The Subject-Matter and Object of Ethnosociology

  In the Russian scientific tradition, there is a rule to divide the subject-matter and object of any scientific discipline. To the extent of the convergence of our scientific approach with the Western one, this rule is constantly called into question, because in the majority of European languages the word “subject-matter” is in meaning and significance entirely identical to the word “object” and is most often denoted by the same expression, derived from the Latin objectum (literally, “that which is thrown before [us]”). In German, there is a specific word, Gegenstand (literally, “that which is found before [us]”), denoting the same concept, but this is a pure calque from the Latin language. The same is true of the relatively late Russian scientific neologism “subject-matter” (pred-met, literally, “that which has been thrown before [us]”). This must be taken into consideration if we are to approach strictly to the definition of Ethnosociology in an international scientific context, at international conferences, symposia, congresses, etc.